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 Much controversy surrounds the question of what ought to be the proper definition of
 'singularity' in general relativity, and the question of whether the prediction of such
 entities leads to a crisis for the theory. I argue that a definition in terms of curve in-
 completeness is adequate, and in particular that the idea that singularities correspond
 to 'missing points' has insurmountable problems. I conclude that singularities per se
 pose no serious problem for the theory, but their analysis does bring into focus several
 problems of interpretation at the foundation of the theory often ignored in the philo-
 sophical literature.
 The mind of man, by nature a monist, cannot accept two nothings;
 he knows there has been one nothing, his biological inexistence in
 the infinite past, for his memory is utterly blank, and that noth-
 ingness, being, as it were, past, is not too hard to endure. But a
 second nothingness which perhaps might not be so hard to bear
 either is logically unacceptable.
 V. Nabokov, Ada
 tPhilosophy Department, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 94305-2155; e-mail:
 encuriel@csli.stanford.edu.
 This paper began life as a small criticism of a few points John Earman makes in Chapter
 2 of his book Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks, and grew as I grew to realize more
 fully the complexity and subtlety of the issues involved. I shall not always point out where
 I am in agreement or disagreement with Earman, much less always discuss why this is so,
 though I shall try to on the most important points. The reader ought to keep in mind,
 though, that Earman's book is the constant foil lurking in the background. I thank
 R. Geroch and D. Malament for stimulating conversations on all these topics. I am also
 grateful to M. Dorato for writing a review of Earman 1995 that made me realize the need
 to reread it and think more about singular structure, and to the History and Philosophy
 of Science Department at Pittsburgh, where I presented an earlier, briefer, version of this
 paper in a colloquium, for stimulating questions.
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 1. Introduction. I suspect that, for many, talk of a singularity in the
 context of general relativity conjures up the image of something like a
 rent in the fabric of spacetime. This metaphor, evocative as it may be,
 perhaps misleads: a web of cloth exists in space and time, and one
 naturally would rely (implicitly, at least) upon this fact were one to
 define what one meant in saying the cloth had a hole one would say
 that points were missing from the cloth, a notion made precise by the
 embedding of the cloth in physical space. When thinking of a singular
 spacetime,' though, one does not have the luxury of imagining it em-
 bedded in any physically meaningful way in a larger space with respect
 to which one can try to define what one means by saying there are
 points missing from spacetime.
 On a manifold endowed with a positive-definite Riemannian metric,
 one can give a precise characterization of what it is for there to be
 missing points that accords quite well with our intuitions. The manifold
 has no missing points if and only if it is Cauchy complete as a metric
 space. On a manifold with a pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz
 signature, such as a spacetime in general relativity, there is no natural
 way to construct a metric that measures the distance between points
 of the manifold, so one cannot employ this technique to test whether
 a spacetime has missing points. By the Hopf-Rinow theorem, the mani-
 fold in the Riemannian case is Cauchy complete with respect to the
 constructed metric if and only if it is geodesically complete with respect
 to the Riemannian metric.2 This naturally suggests that we define a
 spacetime to have missing points if and only if it is geodesically incom-
 plete with respect to the spacetime pseudo-Riemannian metric. Now
 one faces a severe problem, which lies at the heart of the difficulty in
 giving a precise and intuitively satisfying definition of a spacetime sin-
 gularity as a point missing from spacetime: there is no natural way to
 take a Cauchy-like completion of the spacetime manifold in order to
 give substance to the idea that there really are points that in some sense
 'ought to have been included in the spacetime' in the first place.
 The usual tack taken at this point in the physics literature is simply
 to bracket the question of missing points and define a spacetime to be
 singular if and only if it contains incomplete, inextendible curves of a
 certain specified type, and the spacetime manifold itself satisfies a few
 collateral conditions. More precisely, the commonly accepted schema
 for fixing a rigorous definition of a singular spacetime is:
 1. By 'spacetime', I shall always mean a smooth 4-dimensional connected paracompact
 manifold with a fixed smooth metric of Lorentz signature.
 2. See Spivak 1979, Ch. 9, for a precise statement and proof of the theorem.
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 A spacetime (M, gab) satisfying __ is singular if and only if there
 exists a curve y incomplete in the sense that .3
 Such a conception of singular structure actually has a lot to say for
 itself, as capturing the idea that singular structure is somehow physi-
 cally outre, even if one is not able to hook it up cleanly to an idea of
 missing points: an observer travelling along such an incomplete curve
 would be able to experience only a finite total amount of proper time.
 This paper has several concrete aims: to investigate particular ways
 that have been proposed to fill in the blanks of the schematic definition
 with an eye to determining whether they capture the spirit of the idea
 that an incomplete curve corresponds to singular structure; to argue
 that the idea of missing points ought not be central in thought about
 singular structure; and to argue that the reasons most often given for
 eschewing singular structure as unphysical do not withstand scrutiny.
 It also has one overarching, more inchoate aim: to try to give a sense
 of the marvellous philosophical riches still waiting to be mined from
 thorough investigation of the foundations of general relativity which
 is to say, a sense of how little we still comprehend of and about this
 astounding theory, and how much we stand in need of that compre-
 hension if we wish to understand the world.
 2. Curve Incompleteness. The path-breaking work of the mid-1960s
 demonstrating the existence of singular structure in generic solutions
 to the Einstein field equations invoked timelike or null geodesic incom-
 pleteness as a sufficient condition for classifying a spacetime as singu-
 lar, in so far as timelike and null geodesics represent possible world-
 lines of particles and observers and it appears prima facie physically
 suspect for an observer or a particle to be allowed to pop in or out of
 existence right in the middle of spacetime, so to speak.4 There was, how-
 ever, no consensus on what ought to count as a necessary condition.
 Geroch (1968b) gave the first extended discussion of the difficulty
 of framing a satisfactory definition of a singular spacetime. He settled
 provisionally on simple geodesic incompleteness as the criterion for
 singular structure, conceding that the definition is perhaps overly in-
 clusive, but better to brand 10 innocents than to leave one guilty man
 unmarked. The possible innocents include spacetimes that are timelike
 and null geodesically complete but possess incomplete spacelike geo-
 desics (null and timelike incomplete and spacelike complete, for short).
 3. See, for example, Clarke 1993, 10; Joshi 1993, 161-162; Wald 1984, 212-216; and
 Hawking and Ellis 1973, 256-261.
 4. Cf. Geroch 1966, Hawking 1965, Hawking 1967, and Penrose 1965.
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 Spacelike incompletenesss (in the absence of the other two types of
 incompleteness) sets off no serious alarms, for an incomplete spacelike
 geodesic seems to represent structure of the spacetime that is not phys-
 ically accessible to any observer (I will discuss this matter more thor-
 oughly in ?6). Moreover, not only does geodesic incompleteness lock
 up a few possible innocents but, as Geroch proceeds to show, it almost
 certainly fails to nab a few clever guilty parties, for a spacetime can be
 geodesically complete and yet possess an incomplete timelike curve of
 bounded total acceleration-that is to say, an inextendible curve tra-
 versable by a rocket with a finite amount of fuel, along which an ob-
 server could experience only a finite amount of proper time.
 Because of these problems, null and timelike geodesic incomplete-
 ness continued to be used as a sufficient condition for anointing a
 spacetime singular, but was considered to be inadequate as a definition.
 To analyze the structure of non-geodetic curves in the search for a
 necessary condition, a method is required to characterize their com-
 pleteness. Schmidt (1971) appears to have been the first to propose
 using so-called generalized affine parameters to define the completeness
 of general curves. Any curve of unbounded proper length automati-
 cally has an unbounded generalized affine parameter, but not vice
 versa-any inextendible timelike curve of unbounded total acceleration
 and finite total proper time in Minkowski space, for example, has an
 unbounded generalized affine parameter. A spacetime in which every
 inextendible curve has an unbounded generalized affine parameter will
 be referred to as b-complete.5 Thus, one has what Earman (1995, 36)
 refers to as the "semioffical view": a spacetime is said to be singular if
 and only if it is b-incomplete.6 This definition is more general than
 geodesic completeness, in that it implies, but is not implied by, the
 latter, as Geroch's example demonstrates.
 It is difficult to think of a more comprehensive criterion of com-
 pleteness than b-completeness, and I suspect its popularity arises there-
 from, but that it sits comfortably with some of the intuitions that drove
 the search for a definition of singular structure in the first place is not
 so clear on reflection. For the moment, I shall accept b-incompleteness
 as the definition of singular structure when I refer to 'incomplete
 5. 'b' for 'bundle': with this construction one tacitly defines a natural (basis-dependent)
 Riemannian metric on the bundle of frames of the spacetime manifold to define curve
 completeness. See Schmidt 1971 for more details.
 6. Strictly speaking, this is not the standardly accepted definition, since I have not
 mentioned anything about the maximality of the spacetime in question, whether, that
 is, it can be embedded in (thought of as merely a part of) a larger spacetime in such a
 way as to make previously incomplete, inextendible curves extendible. I shall take up
 this issue in ?6.
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 curves', unless I explicitly state otherwise I shall mean b-incomplete,
 inextendible curves. I shall return to some of these questions in ?6.
 3. Curvature Blowup Along Incomplete Curves. While curve incom-
 pleteness seems to capture one aspect of the intuitive picture of singular
 structure, it completely ignores a different aspect, curvature pathology.
 One may measure the growth and diminution of spacetime curvature
 in various ways, but it turns out that the unbounded growth of cur-
 vature according to any of these measures is neither necessary nor suf-
 ficient for the existence of incomplete, inextendible curves. To get an
 idea of the independence of the existence of incomplete curves from
 the presence of curvature pathology, consider the striking ease with
 which examples of a spacetime with everywhere vanishing Riemann
 tensor and incomplete geodesics can be constructed: excise from
 2-dimensional Minkowski space a closed set in the shape of an echidna.
 This example may strike one as cheating, since one has only to restore
 the excised set to restore geodesic completeness (or, in fancier terms,
 one has only to isometrically embed the mutilated spacetime by the
 natural inclusion map back into Minkowski spacetime to restore
 completeness). So a slightly more sophisticated example: for some
 71t
 o < b0 < 2, excise from Minkowski space, represented in polar co-
 ordinates, the wedge consisting of all points with azimuthal coordinate
 0 < b < 00; identify the corresponding points on the hyperplanes b
 = 0 and b = 00. By a suitable redefinition of the coordinate neigh-
 borhoods of the points on b = 0, the resulting space can be given the
 manifold structure of 9T4, and the Minkowski metric can be smoothly
 extended to the points at b = 0, r > 0. It cannot be smoothly extended
 to the points r = 0, however, and so these points must be excised from
 the spacetime. The Riemann tensor of this spacetime vanishes every-
 where, but any geodesic that previously passed through the line r = 0
 will now be incomplete; there is, moreover, no other spacetime into
 which this spacetime can be embedded and in which the metric can be
 smoothly extended.7 This sort of structure is known as a 'conical sin-
 gularity', since it corresponds to taking a wedge out of the
 2-dimensional real plane and pasting the edges together to form a cone.
 The two most commonly used methods of measuring the growth of
 curvature intensity are the behavior of scalar curvature invariants
 along some particular curve through the region of interest, and the
 behavior of the physical components of the Riemann tensor as mea-
 7. This example is from Wald 1984, 214. See Ellis and Schmidt 1977, 921-923, for
 further discussion of this sort of singular structure.
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 sured by a frame parallel-propagated along some particular curve
 through the region of interest (if any of the physical components grow
 without bound in such a frame on a particular curve, then they will in
 all such frames on that curve).8 In accordance with customary usage,
 the existence of an incomplete curve along which the physical com-
 ponents of the Riemann tensor in a parallel-propagated frame do not
 approach a definite finite limiting value will be referred to as p.p.-
 singular structure, and the same of some scalar curvature invariant
 along an incomplete curve will be referred to as s.p. -singular structure
 ('s.p.' for 'scalar polynomial'). The existence of an incomplete curve
 along which the physical components of the Riemann tensor in
 parallel-propagated frames and all its scalar invariants converge to def-
 inite, finite values will be called quasi-regular singular structure.9 Note
 that curvature pathology on these definitions occurs not only if some
 feature of the curvature grows without bound along an incomplete
 curve, but also if it oscillates indefinitely (even if only within finite
 bounds), never settling down to a limiting value.
 I believe there are two primary motivations for using a parallel-
 propagated frame in which to express the components of the Riemann
 tensor. First, one naturally expects the presence of curvature pathology
 to show itself, at the least, in misbehavior of the tidal forces an observer
 would experience.10 The intensity of tidal force, as measured in any
 frame, is directly proportional to the components of the Riemann ten-
 sor in that frame, as one can see from the equation of geodesic devia-
 tion (Hawking and Ellis 1973, 80). In a back-of-the-envelope sort of
 way, the unbounded growth of the components of the Riemann tensor
 in a parallel-propagated frame would seem to indicate that an observer
 traversing that curve would experience unbounded tidal forces as well.
 Second, Clarke (1973) demonstrated that an incomplete curve in a sin-
 gular spacetime has a local extension if and only if the relevant incom-
 8. A frame is a pseudo-orthonormal complete set of basis vectors for the tangent plane
 over a point of a manifold. A frame-field is an assignment of frames to points in some
 specified region, e.g. along a curve or in an open set.
 9. Quasi-regular singular structure is perhaps the most psychologically disturbing, since
 it can be absolutely inobservable until one runs into it, so to speak, creating a hair-
 raising hazard for spacetime navigation.
 10. Tidal force is generated by the differential in intensity of the gravitational field, so
 to speak, at neighboring points of spacetime. For example, when I stand, my head is
 farther from the center of the Earth than my feet, so it feels a (practically negligible)
 smaller pull downward than my feet. For a graphic illustration of the effects of tidal
 forces on observers in strong gravitational fields, see the description in Misner, Thorne,
 and Wheeler 1973, ?32.6, of what would happen to a person standing on the surface of
 a collapsing star-not for the faint of heart, or weak of stomach.
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 plete curve constitutes quasi-regular singular structure. A local exten-
 sion is an isometric embedding of an open subset of the spacetime
 manifold containing the incomplete curve into another spacetime in
 which the curve can be extended. Local extensions can exist even when
 the singular spacetime as a whole is not embeddable as a proper open
 submanifold into a larger spacetime in which the incomplete curves can
 be extended (Ellis and Schmidt 1977, 928-929). Many take the exis-
 tence of local extensions to indicate that nothing local, such as curva-
 ture pathology (narrowly construed), goes wrong in quasi-regular sin-
 gular spacetime, but rather some global structure impedes the extension
 of spacetime. The motivation for using scalar curvature invariants to
 scout for curvature pathology is somewhat more straightforward. A
 scalar curvature invariant at a point does not depend on what curve
 through that point or what frame on a curve through that point one
 uses to probe the point: it is, as the name suggests, invariant. Un-
 bounded growth of a scalar curvature invariant, moreover, is logically
 equivalent to the unbounded growth of the components of the Rie-
 mann tensor as measured in every frame-field along the curve, parallel-
 propagated or not.
 S.p.-singular structure implies, but is not implied by, p.p.-singular
 structure. In fact, all scalar curvature invariants can be zero and yet
 the Riemann tensor not be equal to zero, as in plane gravitational wave
 spacetimes (Penrose 1960, 189). Colliding thick gravitational wave
 spacetimes provide examples of p.p.-singular structure in regions where
 all scalar curvature invariants are well-behaved (Konkowski and Hel-
 liwell 1992). More strikingly, colliding sandwich plane gravitational
 wave spacetimes can exhibit p.p.-singular structure and yet all scalar
 curvature invariants remain identically zero; finally, colliding plane
 gravitational wave spacetimes also provide less artificial examples than
 the conical singularity above of the existence of incomplete curves in
 regions of a spacetime in which the Riemann tensor itself vanishes, viz.
 quasi-regular singular structure (Konkowski and Helliwell 1992). Thus
 the existence of incomplete curves does not ipso facto necessitate any
 sort of curvature pathology as conventionally quantified. That the
 misbehavior of the physical components of the Riemann tensor in a
 parallel-propagated frame or of a scalar curvature invariant in the limit
 as one traverses a curve does not suffice to ensure that the curve be
 b-incomplete follows from examples of spacetimes produced by Suss-
 mann (1988) in which scalar curvature invariants diverge asymptoti-
 cally along complete timelike and null geodesics.
 Though there is no necessary connection of any sort between the
 existence of incomplete curves and curvature pathology as quantified
 in the standard ways, the b-completeness criterion does allow one to
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 categorize singular spacetimes according to the behavior of the cur-
 vature along the incomplete curves as quantified in the standard ways
 sketched above. Earman (1995, 37, 43-44) goes so far as to proclaim
 one of the most seminal virtues of the b-completeness definition that it
 allows for a categorization of this sort. The categorization has a binary
 branching structure: first, an incomplete curve is said to constitute es-
 sential singular structure if there is no larger spacetime into which the
 singular spacetime can be embedded as a proper open submanifold
 such that the curve is extendible in the larger spacetime, and otherwise
 it is said to be inessential; essential singular structure is then subdivided
 into quasi-regular and p.p.-singular structure; finally, p.p.-singular
 structure is subdivided into s.p.-singular and non-s.p.-singular struc-
 ture (Ellis and Schmidt 1977).
 The thought behind the putative importance of the categorization
 scheme seems to be as follows. Very little is known about singular
 structure at the present time, in part due to the difficulty of the math-
 ematics involved in analyzing singular structure rigorously and in part
 due to the vanishingly small amount of experimental access we can get
 to singular structure in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the sin-
 gularity theorems indicate that the spacetime we actually inhabit is
 singular, so it behooves us to try to understand such structure as much
 as possible. Categorizing singular structure appears to be a way for us
 to organize and begin to get a grip on such a daunting task. To be
 appropriate for such a task, I submit, the mathematically different spe-
 cies of singular structure ought to exhibit prima facie different sorts of
 physical behavior, as near as one can judge that sort of thing with the
 crude tools at our disposal; otherwise it will be difficult to see the physi-
 cal relevance of this so far purely mathematical categorization.
 As already noted, in a spacetime with s.p.-singular structure, the
 Riemann tensor components will behave badly as expressed in any
 frame-field along the relevant incomplete curve, and, moreover, will do
 so in general along any curve close enough, as it were, to the incomplete
 curve." The tidal forces a body will feel as it moves along a curve in
 spacetime are naturally measured in a spacelike 3-frame fixed rigidly
 in the body, orthogonal to the timelike unit vector tangent to the curve,
 11. More precisely, in general there will exist an open neighborhood of the incomplete
 curve such that every curve completely contained in the open neighborhood has Rie-
 mann components that are as badly-behaved as one likes in all frames along the curve.
 The 'in general' hedges against the case where the scalar curvature invariant oscillates
 wildly along the incomplete curve; in this case, it may be possible for nearby curves to
 weave cleverly around the incomplete curve in such a way as to avoid the peaks of
 oscillation, and so have well-behaved Riemann tensor components. No hard results are
 known either way in such cases.
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 used to fill out the full 4-frame. Based on what has already been said,
 one might expect that the state of motion of the observer along the
 curve, whether the observer is slowing down and speeding up, or spin-
 ning on his or her axis, would have no effect on how the observer
 experiences the curvature pathology: when a scalar curvature invariant
 grows without bound along a curve, after all, the tidal forces as mea-
 sured in any frame along the curve also will grow without bound. In-
 terestingly enough, however, the state of motion of the observer as it
 traverses an incomplete curve, so-called inertial effects, can be impor-
 tant in determining the physical response of an object to the curvature
 pathology. Whether the object is spinning on its axis or not, for ex-
 ample, or accelerating slightly in the direction of motion, may deter-
 mine whether the object gets crushed to zero volume along an s.p.-
 singular curve or whether it survives (roughly) intact all the way along
 the curve (Ellis and Schmidt 1977, 944-947).
 The effect of the observer's state of motion on his or her experience
 of tidal forces can be even more pronounced in the case of p.p.-singular
 structure that is not s.p.-singular, which is precisely the existence of an
 incomplete curve along which there is a frame-field (necessarily not
 parallel-propagated) relative to which the components of the Riemann
 tensor approach definite, finite limiting values along the curve (Ellis
 and Schmidt 1977, 939). In such a case, the frame-field in which the
 physical components of the Riemann tensor stably approach a limit is
 related to any parallel-propagated frame-field by a Lorentz transfor-
 mation that, in an appropriate sense, behaves pathologically in the limit
 along the curve. For a non-geodetic curve, the proper mode of trans-
 port along a curve of a frame rigidly fixed in the body of an object
 traversing that curve is not parallel-propagation but Fermi-transport
 (Hawking and Ellis 1973, 80-8 1). A Fermi-transported frame is related
 to a parallel-propagated frame by a continuously varying Lorentz
 transform. It can happen, therefore, that an observer cruising along a
 p.p.-singular curve that is not s.p.-singular would experience un-
 bounded tidal forces and so be torn apart while another observer, in a
 certain technical sense approaching the same limiting point as the first
 observer, accelerating and decelerating in just the proper way, would
 experience perfectly well-behaved tidal force, though he would ap-
 proach as near as one likes to the other poor fellow in the midst of
 being ripped to shreds. Again, certain gravitational plane wave space-
 times provide good examples of this phenomenon: an observer trav-
 elling along the incomplete timelike geodesic constituting the singular
 structure would experience unbounded tidal acceleration, whereas any
 observer travelling arbitrarily close by would not (Ellis and Schmidt
 1977, 937).
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 Things can get stranger still. An incomplete geodesic contained en-
 tirely within a compact subset of a spacetime, with accumulation point
 p, that satisfies a certain genericity condition necessarily constitutes
 p.p.-singular structure, so that an observer freely falling along such a
 curve would be torn apart by unbounded tidal forces; it can easily be
 arranged in such circumstances, though, that a separate observer, who
 actually travels through p, will experience perfectly well-behaved tidal
 forces (Hawking and Ellis 1973, 290-292). Here we have an example
 of an observer being ripped apart by unbounded tidal forces right in
 the middle of spacetime, as it were, while other observers cruising
 peacefully by could reach out to touch him or her in solace during the
 final throes of agony.
 This discussion points to a startling conclusion: curvature pathol-
 ogy, as standardly quantified, is not a well-defined property of a region
 of spacetime simpliciter, but may in fact sensitively depend on how one
 probes spacetime regions with various curves, and the state of motion
 of an observer or test particle along the curves! These matters are far
 more subtle and complicated than many, notably Earman (1995),
 would lead one to believe. I believe there is far more work to be done
 straightening out the physical consequences of the existence of singular
 structure.
 Ellis and Schmidt say, vis-'a-vis their classificatory scheme (the ca-
 nonical one):
 It is not claimed here that the singularities discussed are likely to
 occur in physically realistic situations, but rather that only when
 we understand which singularities can occur (a) in general space-
 times, and (b) in space-times with the field equations satisfied for
 particular matter content, can we hope to discuss fruitfully their
 occurrence, equations of motion, and so on (1977, 918).
 I do not mean to argue with the motivation for their classificatory
 scheme, but they beg a serious question with their 'which' in the phrase
 "when we understand which singularities can occur": clearly the cor-
 relative demonstratives of this relative interrogative refer to the differ-
 ent classes of their categorization, but why ought one think that their
 classification picks out physically relevant differences among all pos-
 sible singular structures? This question becomes more poignant when
 one reflects on the fact that curvature pathologies provide the differ-
 entiae for their speciation, and I have attempted to show that curvature
 pathology as customarily quantified is not a straightforward concept
 with clear and unambiguous physical content. The mathematics has
 outrun the physics, but still masquerades as such.
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 Taub is the only person I know in print who shares my apprehension
 about the status of the canonical classification scheme:12
 I have difficulty understanding the usefulness of the classification
 scheme of singularities proposed ... by Ellis and Schmidt. ... I
 think that the important work on singularities now being done
 would become much more important if it turned toward learning
 how to deal with the physics associated with singularities.
 (Taub 1979, 1009)
 He appears to be saying that one ought to concentrate first on trying
 to work out the behavior associated with various singular structures
 we are more or less familiar with in a clear and unambiguous way, and
 only then should one feel confident enough to begin classifying singular
 structures, based on that clear physical knowledge, not on a purely
 mathematical scheme that becomes murky as soon as one tries to think
 about it in physical terms. I heartily concur.13
 4. Missing Points. We now have a precise definition of a singular space-
 time, and some ideas about what such structure implies and does not
 imply about the curvature of spacetime, but, as Earman notes, "it is
 not true to an idea that is arguably a touchstone of singularities in
 relativistic spacetimes: spacetime singularities correspond to missing
 points" (Earman 1995, 40). For those who would argue missing points
 ought to be such a touchstone, Earman sketches what seems to me the
 most (initially) promising position, that, though the idea of missing
 points and that of curve incompleteness lead to prima facie different
 concepts of singular structure, they are extensionally equivalent in all
 physically reasonable singular spacetimes, and so the two concepts are
 for all practical purposes in agreement (Earman 1995, 42). I shall argue
 with this: missing points ought not be a touchstone of discussion of
 singular structure in relativistic spacetimes.
 Missing points, could they be defined, would correspond to a bound-
 ary for a singular spacetime actual points of an extended spacetime
 12. Though R. Geroch has told me in conversation that he does not see the use of the
 classification scheme either, because he is not sure what physical content it has.
 13. A physically unambiguous sense of curvature pathology occurs in, e.g., the
 Friedmann-Roberston-Walker metrics, wherein physical quantities such as the mass-
 density of ponderable matter grow without bound along incomplete curves and thus
 scalar curvature invariants correlatively grow without bound as well. This sort of idea
 is developed nicely in a not very well known paper (to judge by its citation record) by
 Thorpe (1977). I think it would be of interest to see whether a categorization scheme
 based on some of Thorpe's ideas could be constructed and compared to the canonical
 categorization.
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 at which curves incomplete in the original spacetime would terminate. 14
 My argument therefore will alternate between speaking of missing
 points and speaking of boundary points, with no difference of sense
 intended. Before I begin examining the primary attempts to define
 boundary points for singular spacetimes,'5 it is well to note an oddity
 of the situation: compact spacetimes can contain incomplete, inextend-
 ible geodesics, as shown by a simple example due to Misner (1963). In
 a sense that can be made precise, Hausdorff compact sets, from a top-
 ological point of view, 'contain every point they could possibly be ex-
 pected to contain',16 one manifestation of which is that a compact
 manifold cannot be embedded as an open submanifold of any other
 manifold, a necessary prerequisite for attaching a boundary to a sin-
 gular spacetime a manifold-with-boundary minus its boundary is em-
 beddable by the identity map as an open submanifold into itself. This
 already suggests that, even were one able to come up with a satisfactory
 definition of missing points in the context of Lorentzian metrics, it may
 not be extensionally equivalent to the existence of incomplete curves,
 unless we are willing to swallow unpalatable topological structure.
 Schmidt (1971) produced the most well-known boundary construc-
 tion for singular spacetimes, the so-called b-boundary based on the
 b-completeness criterion. The relativity community at first embraced
 Schmidt's construction with enthusiasm, to judge by the remarks in
 Chapter 8 of Hawking and Ellis's canonical work The Large Scale Struc-
 ture of Space- Time. Shortly thereafter, however, Bosshard and Johnson
 showed that the b-boundary had undesirable properties in the most
 physically relevant spacetimes known, the Friedmann-Robertson-
 Walker spacetimes, which to a quite high degree of approximation ac-
 curately model the large scale structure of the actual universe, and the
 Schwarzschild spacetimes, which represent the neighborhood of spher-
 ically symmetric isolated bodies, such as stars. 17 For closed Friedmann-
 Robertson-Walker spacetimes, the b-boundary consists of a single
 point (the same for the big bang as for the big crunch) that is not
 Hausdorff-separated from any point in the interior of the spacetime.
 Not only does one reach the same point, then, by travelling either for-
 14. Strictly speaking, such a space would not be a manifold in the usual sense of the
 term, but a manifold with boundary. See Spivak 1979.
 15. I shall not consider in this paper the 'ideal-point' boundary construction of Geroch,
 Kronheimer, and Penrose (1972), as it requires the singular spacetime to be past- and
 future-distinguishing, a fairly strong causality condition. I intend to sidestep all ques-
 tions about the physical plausibility or necessity of such conditions.
 16. See Geroch 1985, ?30, for a discussion of this precise sense.
 17. Cf. Bosshard 1976 and Johnson 1977.
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 ward or backward in time, but that point is, in a certain sense, arbi-
 trarily near every single spacetime event! Similarly, the b-boundary of
 a Schwarzschild spacetime consists of a single point not Hausdorff-
 separated from any interior point of the spacetime. This certainly will
 not do for the advocates of missing points.
 The reactions to these problems vary widely. Clarke (1993) still em-
 braces the b-boundary construction, and defines a singularity to be a
 point on the b-boundary of a singular spacetime (?3.4). He barely men-
 tions these problems, noting only in passing that the topological struc-
 ture of the singular spacetime with boundary can be "very strange,"
 (40) which I do not think an adequate address. Wald (1984), on the
 other hand, does not like the b-boundary construction precisely be-
 cause of these problems (cf. 213-214), and Joshi (1993) does not even
 mention the possibility of attaching boundaries to singular spacetimes,
 speaking only of incomplete curves.
 A second method of constructing a boundary for singular space-
 times due to Geroch (1968a) fares much better with physically relevant
 spacetimes. In this construction, the so-called g-boundary, geodesic in-
 completeness rather than b-incompleteness defines singular structure,
 and one defines a boundary point to be an equivalence class of incom-
 plete geodesics under the equivalence relation 'approach arbitrarily
 close to each other' (in a certain technical sense). The set of boundary
 points can be given a topology and, in many cases of physical interest,
 can even be given a differentiable and metric structure, so that one can
 locally analyze the structure of spacetime at a 'singularity' rather than
 mess around with troublesome limits along incomplete curves.18 The
 g-boundary construction, moreover, yields the boundaries one might
 have expected on physical grounds in spacetimes of particular physical
 interest: the g-boundary of a Schwarzschild spacetime is a spacelike 3-
 surface, topologically S2 x 9{, and that of a closed Friedmann-Rob-
 ertson-Walker spacetime is the disjoint union of two spacelike S3's.
 Pathological topology rears its head here as well, though, in the case
 of Taub-NUT spacetime: the g-boundary of this spacetime contains a
 point that again is not Hausdorff-separated from any point in the in-
 terior of the spacetime.19
 The advocate of missing points may at this point retort that Taub-
 NUT spacetime hardly constitutes a physically relevant spacetime for
 other reasons, namely that it violates strong causality, which is to say
 18. In certain outre examples, there is an ambiguity in choice of topology for the
 g-boundary, but I shall waive this concern for the sake of argument. There are bigger
 fish to fry.
 19. Cf. Hawking and Ellis 1973, ?5.3, for a thorough account of Taub-NUT spacetime.
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 that it contains causal curves that come arbitrarily close to intersecting
 themselves. While I do not think this reply carries much weight,20 I
 have a better example at hand. Geroch, Can-bin, and Wald (1982)
 construct a geodesically incomplete spacetime with no causal pathol-
 ogy for which a very large class of boundary constructions, including
 the b- and the g-boundary, will yield pathological topology in the com-
 pleted spacetime (the conditions that a boundary construction must
 satisfy to fall prey to this example are quite weak). The advocate of
 missing points may point out that the example appears artificial and
 contrived, with closed sets excised here and conformal factors plastered
 on there, and in short has no physical relevance. Ellis and Schmidt
 (1977, 932) exemplify this sort of simplicity chauvinism: "We know
 lots of examples of [flat singular spacetimes], all constructed by cutting
 and gluing together decent space-times; and because of this construc-
 tion, we know that these examples are not physically relevant."
 I would reply that this judgment has its roots in the schooling our
 intuitions have received in our contemplation of well-worked out ex-
 amples of physical theories, which by and large tend to include math-
 ematical structures that strike us as 'simple' and 'natural'. This ought
 not escape our notice: most such examples of physical theories are
 demonstrably false (Newtonian mechanics and classical Maxwell the-
 ory) or have at the moment insuperable problems of interpretation
 (quantum mechanics) or experimental accessibility (general relativity).
 We should beware of relying too much on intuitions trained in such
 schools-especially when one also recalls how much of our contem-
 plation of those theories involves models of systems with physically
 unrealistic perfect symmetries and vaguely justified approximations
 and simplifications. It may turn out, for all we know, that spacetime
 instantiates just such topological structure as qt4 with certain closed
 sets excised. Perhaps the most important point to notice, though, is
 that "'th4 with certain closed sets excised" is a misleading description of
 such a manifold. It suggests that we built that manifold from a more
 fundamental one, viz. qt4. But that manifold simply is a manifold all on
 its own, with no intrinsic reference to J4, or indeed any other manifold.
 Because of certain facts about how we practice mathematics, the most
 convenient presentation of that manifold happens to be "'{4 with cer-
 tain closed sets excised." One could as legitimately present J4 as that
 manifold glued together with certain other manifolds-with-boundary.
 There are no good grounds I can see for suspecting that the universe
 heeds our preferred methods for organizing mathematical structures.
 20. See Earman 1995, Chs. 6-7, for a discussion of why a violation of strong causality
 simpliciter does not constitute an argument for the unphysicality of a spacetime.
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 I refer those unmoved by this sermon to a remark that Geroch, Can-
 bin, and Wald (1982, 435) make: "The purpose of [a boundary] con-
 struction, after all, is merely to clarify the discussion of various physical
 issues involving singular space-times: general relativity as it stands is
 fully viable with no precise notion of 'singular points.' " When we con-
 template potential phenomena that we have little or no observational
 access to, I submit that the standards for what can count as a physical
 account of a situation ought to be priggishly severe, if we are not un-
 wittingly to degenerate into pure mathematical discourse.21 A construc-
 tion that yields topological pathology, and contains no precise criteria
 for what ought to count as a 'physically relevant' spacetime, does noth-
 ing to clarify discussion of the physical issues involved in analyzing
 singular spacetimes.
 The abstract boundary construction, or a-boundary, proposed by
 Scott and Szekeres (1994) appears at first glance to have the most
 promise for those wanting a natural, workable definition of missing
 points for singular spacetimes.22 It also nicely exemplifies a feature of
 all missing point constructions I know of or can easily imagine, their
 dependence on a prior characterization of incomplete curves. For these
 two reasons, I shall consider it in a little more detail than the previous
 two. An envelopment of a manifold /ris an ordered pair (/, 4) con-
 sisting of a manifold A/ and an embedding 4 into A/ of /Was a proper
 open submanifold of the same dimension.23 Scott and Szekeres propose
 that singular structure always arises by the deletion of points from an
 envelopment of a singular manifold. Given an envelopment (/X', ) of
 A a subset of its topological boundary in A/ will be called a boundary
 set. Now, as it clearly is possible to envelop a given manifold in many
 ways (if the manifold has any envelopment at all), one does not want
 to consider merely boundary sets of manifolds under particular envel-
 opments, but rather equivalence classes of boundary sets under some
 appropriate equivalence relation. To this end, Scott and Szekeres pro-
 pose the following:
 21. R. Geroch stressed this point to me in a conversation in which he also dismissed
 the adequacy of his own g-boundary construction merely because it gave unphysical
 results in the admittedly contrived example of Geroch, Can-bin, and Wald (1982). It
 gives very nice results in almost all other known types of examples.
 22. Whether the a-boundary construction satisfies the conditions of Geroch, Can-bin,
 and Wald (1982), and so necessarily leads to pathological topology for certain space-
 times, is not clear, for as of yet Scott and Szekeres have not defined a topology for their
 construction at all. From the structure of the construction, I suspect that any topology
 one would define for it would satisfy Geroch, Can-bin, and Wald's conditions.
 23. When it can cause no confusion, I shall often identify ///with its image under the
 envelopment mapping.
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 Definition 4.1 A boundary set B ofY in an envelopment (/1/, 0) is said
 to cover the boundary set B' ofY in an envelopment (/k/', 4') iffor
 every open neighborhood U' in 4/1' of B' there exists an open neigh-
 borhood U in /1/ of B such that
 o o4-1[[u' n o[/] c u.
 A boundary set B may cover another boundary set B' while B' does
 not cover B. One easily sees, however, that defining B and B' to be
 equivalent if they mutually cover each other does in fact yield an equiv-
 alence relation; the equivalence class of the boundary set B under this
 relation will be written '[B]' and called an abstract boundary set. An
 equivalence class that contains a singleton as a representative member
 will be called an abstract boundary point. The collection of all abstract
 boundary points is the abstract or a-boundary, written 'IS [/M'.
 Although A1L [L/ by itself is defined without reference to any partic-
 ular geometrical structure on A such as a pseudo-Riemannian metric
 or an affine connection, which Scott and Szekeres take to be one of its
 cardinal virtues, to define singular structure they must select a class of
 curves Con i/satisfying what they call the bounded-parameter prop-
 erty: roughly speaking, the curves in 6-must cover the manifold and
 must be such that the parameter along any of the curves grows without
 bound if and only if it grows without bound along every nice repara-
 metrization of the curve. The class of geodesics on a manifold with
 affine connection and the class of C1 curves parametrized by general-
 ized affine parameter on a manifold with affine connection provide two
 examples of classes of curves satisfying the bounded-parameter prop-
 erty. The idea is that curves in 6will be used to probe the boundary
 to distinguish points 'at infinity' from points that can be reached in a
 finite parameter interval and hence are candidate singular points. The
 details of the construction and definitions hereon out become quite
 complicated, so I shall sketch only the most salient points. First, for a
 candidate singular spacetime Ag Scott and Szekeres wish to remove
 from consideration all abstract boundary points that have a represen-
 tative singleton boundary point in some envelopment through which,
 in a certain technical sense, the spacetime metric can be smoothly ex-
 tended. In this case, the thought is, the original spacetime simply had
 not been made as 'large' as it reasonably could have. Such points will
 be called regular, and need not apply as potential singular points. Next,
 one fixes the class of curves 6e and defines the 6-boundary to be the
 class of a-boundary points that have a singleton representative in some
 envelopment that is the limit point of a curve in 6; such points are
 referred to as approachable. All other a-boundary points are unap-
 proachable. It is straightforward to show that the property of being
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 approachable or unapproachable is invariant under the defining a-
 boundary equivalence relation, but one must keep in mind that it de-
 pends crucially on the class of curves 6chosen. A non-regular point in
 an envelopment A/ on the boundary of i/that is not the limit point of
 any curve of bounded parameter in 6will be called a point at infinity;
 if, moreover, it cannot be covered by any regular boundary set of an-
 other envelopment, it will be called an essential point at infinity. This
 property is clearly invariant under the a-boundary equivalence relation,
 and so one speaks of a-boundary points at infinity. A non-regular
 boundary point p of ,in the envelopment A/ that is the limit point of
 some curve in 6of bounded parameter will be called a singular point.
 If there exists a non-singular boundary set of another envelopment that
 covers p, then it is said to be removable; otherwise it is essential. Again,
 this property is invariant under the a-boundary equivalence relation,
 so one says that [p] is an essentially singular a-boundary point. These,
 finally, are the missing points Scott and Szekeres aimed to construct.
 The most obvious problem facing the a-boundary approach is its
 physical significance. First off, a 'point' of the a-boundary is not clearly
 a point in any usual sense of the term: an individual boundary point of
 one envelopment of a manifold can always be made to cover an un-
 countable number of boundary points in another envelopment. It is
 the case that every representative boundary set of an a-boundary point
 must be compact, but it is not even true that every compact boundary
 set is a representative of some a-boundary point, nor does the a-bound-
 ary point equivalence relation preserve connectedness and simple-
 connectedness ought one think of a candidate singularity as a single
 point or as a non-simply connected, non-connected compact set? Then
 there is the unapproachability of some a-boundary points: it can hap-
 pen, for instance, that regular a-boundary points of a pseudo-Rieman-
 nian manifold are not approachable by any geodesic of the metric. The
 existence of such extraneous points makes one wonder about the physi-
 cal relevance of those boundary points that are approachable by curves
 in the spacetime. It is also not clear what relevance the 'covering' re-
 lation they define has to anything physical: for a given 6, 6-boundary
 sets may cover unapproachable boundary sets; non-regular unap-
 proachable boundary sets may cover approachable regular boundary
 sets; essential boundary points at infinity may cover anything except
 singular boundary sets and may be covered by anything except regular
 points; essential singular points may cover any kind of boundary set.
 Given the promiscuity of possible covering relations, I believe an ar-
 gument is needed why this definition captures any physically relevant
 information, an argument they do not provide.
 Neither do Scott and Szekeres broach a technical point that raises
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 a serious difficulty for their approach at the very initial stages: some
 spacetimes, such as Taub spacetime, have two incomplete curves such
 that the spacetime can be extended so as to make either one or
 the other curve extendible, but no extension of the spacetime exists
 that makes both curves simultaneously extendible.24 On Scott and
 Szekeres's account, both of these curves run into regular boundary
 points, and so neither will be counted as possible singularities, even
 though there is no actual envelopment of the spacetime in which both
 curves are extendible.
 Finally, on this view, incomplete curves wholly contained in com-
 pact regions of spacetime cannot count as singular structure, trivially
 so since compact manifolds cannot be embedded as proper open sub-
 manifolds of another manifold. Scott and Szekeres not only gamely
 swallow this consequence, but actually claim that it is a "sine qua non
 of any successful theory of singularities" (Scott and Szekeres 1994, 34),
 and cite Shepley and Ryan 1978 as evidence for this claim. This is not
 only a contentious view, at best, which they do not bother to argue for,
 and not only seems to run counter to the spirit of most considerations
 forwarded in discussions of singular structure, which revolve around
 incomplete curves, but seems seriously to conflict with their own stated
 criterion for selecting those points of the a-boundary that will be sin-
 gular points, viz. limit points of curves of bounded parameter, i.e.,
 incomplete curves.
 This last point brings out my final consideration against the idea of
 missing points as touchstones in the investigation of singular space-
 times, which is a simple one: the definition of singular spacetimes by
 incomplete curves is logically prior to the construction of missing
 points for singular spacetimes. All the missing point constructions I
 know of, and all the ways I can more or less easily imagine trying to
 concoct a new one, rely on probing the spacetime with curves of some
 sort or other to discover where points may be thought of as missing,
 just as in the Riemannian case one cannot complete a manifold until
 one knows which Cauchy sequences do not have a limit point, or equiv-
 alently which geodesics are incomplete. One, however, does not need
 any conception of a missing point, much less a definition of such, to
 define and investigate the existence of incomplete curves on a manifold.
 I therefore disagree with the gist of much of the discussion of Earman
 1995, Ch. 2, wherein he suggests that unclarity plagues the semi-official
 definition of a singular spacetime, in terms of b-incompleteness, insofar
 as, on the face of it, one does not know how it relates to the idea of
 missing points. Incomplete curves seem to me a fine definition of sin-
 gular structure on their own.
 24. See, e.g., Ellis and Schmidt 1977, 920, and Hawking and Ellis 1973, ?5.8.
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 5. Global vs. Local Properties of a Manifold. There is at least one prima
 facie good reason why it would be useful to have a precise character-
 ization of points missing from singular spacetimes: one would then be
 able to analyze the structure of the spacetime 'locally at the singularity',
 instead of taking troublesome, perhaps ill-defined limits along incom-
 plete curves. The power and elegance of Penrose's conformal construc-
 tion of infinity for asymptotically flat spacetimes lie precisely in the
 ability one gains to perform such analysis locally at infinity, without
 relying on limits.25 The example of Geroch, Can-bin, and Wald (1982)
 already discussed makes the prospects for a reasonable boundary con-
 struction for singular spacetimes poor. I believe this should not have
 been very surprising.
 In desiring a boundary so as to have a place to 'analyze structure lo-
 cally', one ought to be clear on what one means by 'locally'. One some-
 times hears talk of a global, as opposed to a local, feature of a spacetime,
 but I know of no precise characterization of the difference. I believe this
 distinction plays a crucial role in a proper understanding of the stan-
 dardly proposed definitions of a singular spacetime in terms of incom-
 plete curves. I therefore offer the following precise definition of this
 distinction. I formulate it initially for topological properties both for the
 sake of generality and because I think it easier to get a feel for the defi-
 nition in the sparser arena of topological structure than in the more
 cluttered arena of differentiable manifolds with an affine structure.
 Consider the class Z of all topological spaces. A topological property
 Q3 is a subclass of this class. A topological space Shas the property Q3
 if S E Q3.
 Definition 5.1 A topological property Q3 is local if it has thefollowing
 feature. a given topological space S has the property Q3 if and only
 if Sis such that every neighborhood of every point has a subneigh-
 borhood that, considered as a topological space in its own right, with
 the restriction topology, has the property Q3.26
 Roughly speaking, a local property must hold in arbitrarily small
 neighborhoods of every point of a topological space, but not necessar-
 ily in every neighborhood of every point of the space; and conversely,
 if the property holds in arbitrarily small neighborhoods of every point
 of a space, it must hold for the entire space for it to be local.
 25. See Wald 1984, ?11.1, for an account of Penrose's construction.
 26. This sense of 'local' has nothing to do with that often bandied about in discussions
 of the foundations of quantum mechanics.
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 Definition 5.2 A topological property is global if and only if it is not
 local.27
 One could be sure of ascertaining for a given topological space whether
 the local property Q3 held or not by checking for Q3 at individual points
 of the space (quite a few points, to be sure), whereas a global property
 cannot be checked by examing the structure of the space at any collec-
 tion of points. As one should expect, local compactness, local con-
 nectedness, and local simple connectedness for example all come out
 to be local on this definition, whereas compactness, paracompactness,
 connectedness, and simple connectedness come out to be global.28
 In an analogous manner, one can now straightforwardly character-
 ize properties of differentiable manifolds and of differentiable mani-
 folds with an affine connection as either local or global. Non-trivial
 examples of local properties for a manifold include any structure re-
 siding entirely on the tangent planes over every point. For a manifold
 with affine connection, both the property of geodesic completeness and
 of geodesic incompleteness come out to be global properties, again as
 one should expect. One might initially have thought that geodesic in-
 completeness, at least, ought to have been a local property if a geo-
 desic came to an end abruptly, as it were, surely one ought to be able
 to pinpoint where this happens. If one could do this, however, then it
 also would seem that one could continue the geodesic. If there were a
 point on the manifold whereat the incomplete geodesic terminated,
 however, one could take a chart around that point diffeomorphic to
 some open set of gin, push the geodesic and the connection down to
 9n , where the geodesic obviously would be extendible, and pull the
 extended version back to the manifold, contradicting the hypothesis
 that the geodesic could not be continued.
 A point of spacetime, in the usual way of thinking of these matters,
 represents an event, a highly localized occurrence in spacetime such as
 a snapping of fingers or the collision of two billiard balls. It represents
 an instant of some ponderable object, the specious 'now' of some sen-
 tient being. When thinking on cosmic scales, the sun, at a certain in-
 27. By this 'not', I do not mean the logical negation of the definition of 'local' but rather
 the class complement of the class of local properties in the class of all topological
 properties-interestingly enough, these do not come to the same thing. Were the logical
 negation of the definition of 'local' used to define 'global', this would entail that a space
 with the global property 93 would have a point and a neighborhood of that point such
 that every subneighborhood of that neighborhood did not have 93. Compactness is
 clearly not a local property, and yet does not satisfy the negation of the definition of
 'local'.
 28. Cf. Hocking and Young 1988 for definitions of these topological properties.
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 stant, can profitably be thought of as occupying a single point of space-
 time. In short, spacetime points pertain to discrete objects, very broadly
 construed, that can be localized in an intuitive sense. There is no a
 priori reason to suspect that the existence of an incomplete curve, a
 global phenomenon, could be tied in any natural or reasonable way to
 the existence of a particular point in an extended manifold. Incomplete
 curves are not discrete, localizable objects in the appropriate sense.
 A detractor will likely balk at this line of thought, pointing to the
 case of Riemannian manifolds, wherein incomplete curves can be nat-
 urally associated with points of an extended manifold. I would reply
 that it is merely a happy accident in the Riemannian case that one can
 arrange this. One has no grounds for suspecting that one will be able
 to do this in the general case, and in fact, as I endeavored to show, one
 has reasons to suspect that in general one will not be able to do this,
 since curve incompleteness is global and a missing point is, well, a
 point, and so prima facie 'local'. Of course, even for Lorentzian man-
 ifolds, in certain cases, one will be able to associate to an incomplete
 curve a missing point with ease-e.g. all the geodesics aimed at the
 origin in Minkowski spacetime (in some global coordinate system) with
 the origin removed-in general, though, one ought not expect the two
 to have anything to do with each other.
 The demand that singular structure be localized at a place bespeaks
 an old Aristotelian substantivalism that invokes the maxim, "To exist
 is to exist in space and time."29 When I speak of 'Aristotelian substan-
 tivalism' here, I refer to the fact that Aristotle thought that everything
 that exists is a substance and that all substances can be qualified by the
 Aristotelian categories, two of which are location in time and location
 in space. In particular, not only substantivalists but also relationalists
 in debates about the nature of spacetime points could (and often do, I
 think) consistently fall prey to this particular brand of substantivalism.
 By focusing attention on the way that spacetimes can have actual fea-
 tures that do not rely on the existence or absence of any particular
 point, and are not instantiated at any particular point, I think that this
 distinction between global and local properties of spacetime could have
 a salutary effect on the moribund debate between substantivalists and
 relationalists. I hope to work on this matter in the future.
 I believe Geroch, Can-bin, and Wald (1982, 435) deserve the last
 word on this subject: "Perhaps the localization of singular behavior
 will go the way of 'simultaneity' and 'gravitational force.' "
 6. The Finitude of Existence. I turn now to examine whether singular
 29. This formulation of the maxim is due to Earman 1995, 28.
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 spacetimes as characterized are objectionable on physical or interpre-
 tive grounds, and whether one is forced to or ought to take them as
 indicating the 'breakdown' of classical general relativity, as some would
 have it. In the process, I shall examine whether b-completeness is
 wholly consistent with some of the explicit sentiments behind using
 curve incompleteness as a criterion for singular structure.
 Two types of worries, one psychological, the other physical, give rise
 to the dissatisfaction with the existence of incomplete curves in relativ-
 istic spacetimes. Trying to imagine the experience of an observer tra-
 versing one of the incomplete curves provokes the psychological anxi-
 ety, for that observer would, of necessity, be able to experience only a
 finite amount of proper time's worth of observation, even were he, in
 Earman's evocative conceit, to have drunk from the fountain of youth.
 The physical worry arises from the idea that particles could pop in and
 out of existence right in the middle of a singular spacetime, and space-
 time itself could simply come to an end, though no fundamental physi-
 cal mechanism or process is known that could produce such effects.
 These two types of worries are not always clearly distinguished from
 each other in discussions of singular structure, but I think it important
 to keep in mind that in fact there are two distinct types of problems
 envisaged for incomplete curves, requiring to some degree two separate
 sorts of responses.
 The existence of incomplete spacelike curves is often felt not to be
 so objectionable as that of incomplete timelike or null curves, on the
 grounds that it represents structure beyond the experience of any ob-
 server.30 I submit that, on this criterion, neither ought one be so both-
 ered by the existence of incomplete timelike or null curves, for an ob-
 server travelling along such a curve will never experience the fact that he
 has only a finite amount of proper time to exist-there is no spacetime
 point, no event in spacetime, that corresponds to the observer's ceasing
 to exist. This is not to say that the person traversing this worldline
 cannot surmise the fact that he has only a finite amount of time to
 exist, rather that there will never be an instant when the observer ex-
 periences himself dissipating, popping out of existence as it were.
 These considerations also suggest a tension between the definition of
 singular structure by b-incompleteness and the intuitions that drove
 some to look to incomplete curves as marks of singular structure in the
 first place. Only the finitude of proper time matters so far as the expe-
 rience of a possible observer goes-a generalized affine parameter has
 no clear physical significance-but, while a curve's being b-incomplete
 implies that the curve is of finite total proper time, the converse is not
 30. See, e.g., Hawking and Ellis 1973, ?8.1.
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 true: timeline curves of unbounded total acceleration in Minkowski
 space can be of finite total proper time and yet be b-complete. I would
 even say that such a curve should be more disturbing on reflection to
 those with such intuitions than an incomplete null geodesic, for the
 concept of 'proper time' does not apply to null curves at all, even
 though they are the possible paths of massless particles.
 I speculate, with no hard evidence, that people have not wanted to
 count such curves as constituting singular structure because of vague
 worries about energy conservation. In general relativity, however, there
 is no 'energy conservation'-there is not even a general, rigorous, in-
 variant definition of 'energy'!31 There is thus no a priori reason to sus-
 pect that anything in the structure of general relativity excludes a par-
 ticle's getting shot out asymptotically 'to infinity' in finite total proper
 time, having started from perfectly regular (in whatever sense of that
 term one likes) initial data. An example of a spacetime that was
 b-complete for all timelike curves of bounded total acceleration but not
 for timelike curves of unbounded total acceleration would clarify some
 of these issues, and I conjecture that examples of such spacetimes exist.
 Those who would not want to count such a spacetime as singular would
 be forced to give up b-incompleteness as the criterion for singular
 structure-which, given the lack of a clear physical interpretation of
 b-incompleteness in general, as opposed to incompleteness with respect
 to total proper time, I would not mind. Of course, if incomplete time-
 like curves of unbounded total acceleration constituted singular struc-
 ture, then every solution to Einstein's field equations would be singular.
 Many would reject this conclusion out of hand, but it does not seem
 so unbearable to me. Singular structure would simply be one more type
 of global structure that all spacetimes necessarily had, along with, e.g.,
 paracompactness. Once so much was settled, then one could further
 classify spacetimes, according to the needs of the project at hand, by
 satisfaction of various more restrictive types of completeness.
 On physical grounds, curve incompleteness has been objected to be-
 cause it seems to imply that particles could be 'annihilated' or 'created'
 right in the middle of spacetime, with no known physical force or mech-
 anism capable of pulling off such a feat.32 The demand that a spacetime
 be maximal, i.e., have no proper extension, often rests on similar con-
 siderations: Clarke (1975, 65 66) and Ellis and Schmidt (1977, 920)
 conjecture that maximality is required by the lack of a physical process
 that could cause spacetime to draw up short, as it were, and not con-
 tinue on as it could have, were it to have an extension. This sort of
 31. See Curiel 1998.
 32. Cf., e.g., Hawking 1967, 189.
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 argument, though, relies (implicitly) on a certain picture of physics that
 does not sit so comfortably in general relativity: that of the dynamical
 evolution of a system. From a certain quite natural point of view in
 general relativity, spacetime does not evolve at all. It just sits there,
 sufficient unto itself, very like the Parmenidean One. From this point
 of view, the question of a physical mechanism capable of causing the
 spacetime manifold not to have all the points it could have had, as it
 were, becomes less poignant, perhaps even misleading. An opponent
 of this point of view could argue that such a move could foreclose the
 possibility of deterministic physics, to which I would whole-heartedly
 agree, for we already know that general relativity does not guarantee
 deterministic physics: there may be no Cauchy surface in our space-
 time, or there may even be so-called naked singularities.33
 Perhaps a more serious worry is that such a viewpoint would seem
 to deny that certain types of potentially observable physical phenom-
 ena require explanation, when on their face they would look puzzling,
 to say the least. Were we to witness particles popping in and out of
 existence, the mettle of physics would surely demand an explanation.
 I would contend in such a case, however, that a perfectly adequate
 explanation was at hand: we would be observing singular structure. If
 there were no curvature pathology around, such a response might ap-
 pear to be ducking the real issue, viz., why is there this anomalous
 singular structure when all our strongest intuitions and metaphysical
 principles tell us it should be impossible? Far from ducking the issue,
 the viewpoint I advocate is the only one I know of that gives a toehold
 on looking for precise answers to such questions-or, more precisely,
 on making such questions precise in the first place.
 To make the point more clear, consider the big bang singular struc-
 ture. Those who balk at this viewpoint ought be as equally troubled
 by the big bang singular structure as they are by the example under
 discussion, for it just as surely 'lacks an explanation'. From the view-
 point I advocate, questions about what happened 'before' the big bang,
 or why the universe 'came into being', can come from their former
 nebulosity into sharper definition, for they become questions about the
 presence of certain global structure in the spacetime manifold, in prin-
 ciple no different from paracompactness, connectedness, or the exis-
 tence of an affine connection, and one can at least envisage possible
 forms of an answer to the question, 'Are there any factors that neces-
 sitated spacetime's having such and such global structure?'. And were
 we actually to observe particles popping in and out of existence, we
 could formulate and begin trying to answer the analogous questions.
 33. See Earman 1995, Ch. 3 for a discussion of these phenomena.
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 The most serious problem I can imagine for the viewpoint I advocate
 is that of representing our subjective experience, experience that seems
 inextricably tied up with ideas of evolution and change. I suggest that
 this problem is not an idiosyncracy of the viewpoint I advocate, but in
 fact arises from the character of general relativity itself: 'dynamical
 evolution' and 'time' are subtle and problematic concepts in the theory
 no matter what viewpoint one takes, as attested by the most notorious
 and seemingly intractable problem in the drive to 'quantize' gravity,
 the so-called problem of time.34 My viewpoint has the virtue of calling
 attention to this very fact, that, to judge by the preponderant mass of
 literature in both physics and philosophy, is easily overlooked: general
 relativity demands of us a profound rethinking of several dearly held,
 deeply related concepts and the relations among them.
 It has become fashionable of late to say that such problems point
 to the need to find an 'interpretation' of general relativity in the same
 sense in which the measurement problem in quantum mechanics de-
 mands that that theory be 'interpreted'. Belot (1996), for instance,
 reaches this conclusion from speculating on the problems encountered
 in trying to develop a quantum theory of gravity. I think this is a serious
 misunderstanding. Quantum mechanics demands an interpretation be-
 cause it is not clear how to model physical phenomena, how to model
 the outcomes of experiments simpliciter: the predictions of standard
 quantum theory are in some sense in contradiction with the outcomes
 of experiments, but not in such a way as to invalidate the theory-an
 extraordinary state of affairs. There is no analogous problem in general
 relativity. In a paper on the foundations of quantum mechanics, dis-
 cussing the lack in general relativity of an explicit representation of our
 experience of a privileged instant in our history, the 'now', Stein (1984,
 645) makes a most a propos remark: "although relativity does not give
 us a representation of that experience, there is no incompatibility be-
 tween the experience and the theory: a gap is not a contradiction."
 There is a gap between the raw materials the theory provides us and
 the rich content of our experience to be explained-but it is no incom-
 pleteness of general relativity, no lack of an 'interpretation', that it does
 not illuminate the experience it predicts for an observer, no more than
 Newtonian mechanics fell short in so far as it did not show why I
 understand by certain irritations of my eardrum from perturbations in
 the ambient air pressure the import of the spoken word 'gap'.
 Even though general relativity is not obscure in the sense that quan-
 tum mechanics is, it would be rash to assume that we have isolated and
 digested all the ways in which a proper understanding of general rel-
 34. See Kuchar 1992 for a thorough discussion of this problem.
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 ativity requires us to modify in fundamental ways root concepts and
 the relations among them, as special relativity required us, for example,
 to modify our concept of 'mass' to attain to its proper understanding.
 We surely have much still to learn from it, much to unlearn of old
 patterns of thought, if we are to understand more properly how to try
 to understand the physical world.
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